Social Inclusion, National Identity and the Moral Imagination

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ABSTRACT

How does the influential policy metaphor ‘social inclusion’ achieve its effects? To answer this question well, we argue that policy analysts need to attend to the intuitive-emotional, rather than the rational-calculative, domain of policy knowledge. Within this intuitive-emotional domain, we emphasise the moral imagination, which works through representation, connecting people with certain values or desires, and the influence of the passions. Evolving ideas about national identity have strongly influenced official accounts of social inclusion, because these ideas set out the attributes a person must have in order to be considered a ‘true’ citizen. We describe the evolution of official representations of national identity during the 20th century — from the ‘character’ or ‘self’ attributed to whiteness, to an account of the ‘Australian way of life’, and finally to certain social and moral values said to signify ‘the Australian way’. We conclude that present renderings of national identity are open-ended, provisional, and watchful. Accordingly, official renderings of social inclusion emphasise moral and behavioural issues at the expense of human and citizenship rights as the basis of belonging.

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Introduction

For almost two decades ‘social inclusion’ has played an influential part in justifying the directions of welfare reform. During the 1980s and 1990s the idea spread through continental Europe, achieving prominence in European Commission and European Union deliberations about anti-poverty programs. It then became a central plank of Blair’s New Labour and entered the field of policy analysis and development studies more generally (Jones & Smyth 1999). In Australia the Howard government has adopted social inclusion to justify mutual obligation and community participation programs. The phrase is appealing. Blair, for example, promises ‘a nation united, with common purpose, with no one shut out or excluded’ (cited by Jones & Smyth 1999, p. 4). Perhaps this why social inclusion has been so widely advanced, even by those critical of government policy: the Child Poverty Action Group in Britain, for example, and the Australian Council of Social Service in Australia. The term’s ambiguity also leaves plenty of room for inconsistency in government policy. In Australia, for example, the government espouses social inclusion at the local level, while excluding asylum seekers nationally.

The contested nature of social inclusion/exclusion has been extensively discussed elsewhere (see, for example, Byrne 1999; Levitas 1998; Silver 1994; Walters 2000) and it is not our intention to retrace that territory here. Rather, we look at how social inclusion, as policy metaphor, actually works. We suggest it operates through an appeal to the ‘moral imagination’; that is, social inclusion deals with how participatory relations ought to operate, relies heavily on representation, and has emotional (rather than rational-calculative) foundations. We also propose that official appeals to social inclusion are linked with ideas of ‘national identity’ that are themselves a product of the moral imagination. Ideas about national identity set out the attributes and values of a person who truly belongs, and so shape how policy makers understand and mobilise the metaphor of social inclusion.

Readers will note that we often use the term ‘official’ to describe representations of social inclusion and national identity. This indicates our focus on representations circulating in policies, political speeches, and other government mandated documents. In this sense, these representations are the ‘ruling’ (but by no means uncontested) ideas. And it is with them that we are primarily concerned.

Social inclusion and the moral imagination

Policy knowledge, metaphors, and imagination

As a ‘word that works’, social inclusion operates as a policy metaphor crystallising the desired goals and directions of policy. Terms such as ‘economic growth’, ‘citizenship’, and ‘social capital’ do the same kind of work. Such phrases form an
integral part of policy knowledge, structuring what is known and how it is known. But how do they achieve their effects?

The mainstream policy literature cannot satisfactorily answer this question because it largely treats policy knowledge as though it were a matter of rational calculation. Yehezkel Dror (1968) with his logical means-ends sequences is only the high priest of a much longer tradition. Even Charles Lindblom (1959, 1979) talks of the science of muddling through. And it is not only social planners who talk about policy as though it were a matter of rational calculation. Critical theorists do likewise. Marxists assume that senior public servants and politicians make decisions based on reasonably careful calculations about economic costs and benefits even while acknowledging that the system effectively directs policy in the interests of capital. And in a post-structural vein, governmentality theorists talk about ‘political rationality’ even when they emphasise happenstance, contingency, and the fabrication of political ‘truths’ (Rose & Miller 1992). For them, governance is ‘any relatively calculated practice of the direction of conduct’ (Dean 1992, p. 218; emphasis added).

The predominant emphasis of such accounts suggests that governments make policy rationally, whether by applying a positivist methodology (the account of the social planners) or by the purposeful promotion of particular interests (the account of the critics). Borrowing from Jung ([1921] 1971) it could be said that these accounts emphasise the importance of reason and observation, and thus lie in quadrant B of Figure 1.

Against this, we suggest that the success of policy metaphors does not depend on logical calculation or empirical deduction, or certainly not on them alone. Rather it relies on an intuitive sense — a kind of ‘aha’ feeling — of ‘oh yes, that’s it; that’s what it’s about’ backed by a moral preference which says, ‘yes, that’s what it should be about’. In this way it has strong affiliations with the territory spanned by intuition and emotion (quadrant C in Figure 1). We are not making an exclusive claim in this respect. The rational-calculative mode remains important: politicians are likely to
calculate benefits when referring to social inclusion and social planners may well attempt to measure its dimensions. Neither do we suppose that reason and emotion are necessarily antithetical — indeed, and as we shall show — they often work in each other’s service. So in drawing attention to the expressive side of policy, we are making evident what is so often disguised.

In emphasising the importance of this sphere, we pay particular attention to the role of imagination. Kant ([1781/1787] 1933) suggests that imagination sits between the chaotic world of the senses and the purely abstract capacity of the mind. He proposes that imagination cannot be observed and analysed in any traditional sense. It is ‘an art concealed in the depth of the human soul whose real modes of activity nature is hardly ever likely to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze’ ([1781/1787] 1933, p. 181; cited by Warnock 1976, p. 32). Despite this, writers on imagination (Kant included) consistently assign it three characteristics:

- **Representation.** Imagination represents a reality not materially or actually present.

- **A connective element.** In calling on certain symbols or representations, imagination makes a claim for their transcendental significance.

- **The association between imagination and the passions.** Imagination is fired by the emotions; they are its fuel.

We now consider how each of these elements bears on social inclusion.

**Representation and social inclusion**

Re-presentation, making present what is actually absent, is the mind’s unique gift, and since our whole mental terminology is based on metaphors drawn from the vision’s experience, this gift is called imagination, defined by Kant as ‘the faculty of intuition without the presence of the object’ (Arendt 1978, p. 76).

Social inclusion is a figment of the imagination: a representation of intent or vision rather than something actually or materially present. As such, it derives from a fundamental (and in the field of social policy, profoundly neglected) feature of human thought. Early on, Aristotle commented that ‘the soul never thinks without a mental image’, and attributed the capacity to form mental images to the imagination (Aristotle [431] 1957, p. 15–20; cited by Thomas 2001, p. 2). Hume ([1739/1740] 1978) distinguishes between impressions (the immediate sensation of events) and ideas (the later recollection of those sensations), and argues that imagination underlies the idea-forming capacity, which, through association, allows us to produce general categories such as ‘apple’, ‘wild horse’, or, indeed, ‘social inclusion’.
The representational force of social inclusion is directed toward community belonging. On this score, it is only the most recent addition to a much longer tradition. Historically, such considerations have been advanced under different names, for example: social solidarity (Durkheim [1893] 1933; Titmuss 1963); citizenship (Marshall [1949] 1964; Rawls 1971, 1993), and social capital (Putnam 1993, 1995; Etzioni 1995, 1997). As these examples illustrate, there is considerable variety under the common rubric of community belonging, with proponents variously focusing on such things as social rights, the behaviour of members and the bonds that unite communities (for discussion, see Harris 2002). The political and ideological force of these representations is also widely different. A focus on citizenship or human rights (for example, Marshall or Rawls) produces a more structural/critical position than communitarian/moral accounts centred on the local community (for example, Etzioni).

The relationship of such representations with ‘reality’ begs difficult questions. Instructively, Hume ([1739/1740] 1978, p. 9) suggests that while memory is ‘tied to the production of ideas, joined as they were and in the order in which they originally came as impressions’, imagination is able to ‘transpose and change [those] ideas’ (cited by Warnock 1976, p. 135). So what if this imaginative re-ordering distorts empirical reality? It might be objected that any such question is out of order, as, given their representational quality, ideas such as social inclusion and citizenship can hardly be declared ‘wrong’ or ‘false’. But this does not settle the matter. The difficulty persists precisely because representations in public policy so frequently claim, implicitly or explicitly, to be founded in fact. Official representations of social inclusion, to take a case in point, currently give workforce participation a pivotal place and suggest that such participation is largely determined by individual motivation and the skills of potential recruits. Any such rendering is open to empirical challenge. In this instance we could investigate the relative importance of public services and cultural activities vis-à-vis workforce participation in determining social cohesion. Or we could compare the influence of the availability of local work against individual motivation and skills in determining labour force participation rates. What we stress here is that any given policy representation may have a better or worse fit with the reality it purports to describe. Hence recognising the force of imaginative dealings in public policy is not to say that anything goes.

The relationship between representation and empirical reality also matters when an imaginative re-ordering leads to the distortion of historical events. The children overboard incident provides an example. This affair also graphically illustrates how a prior representation structures the re-ordering process (see, for example, Howard 2002). All the evidence showed that the wrong photos had been produced. Why did it take so long for the government to recognise its error? Was it just a matter of bungling or a need to cover up some serious electoral misbehaviour? Either or both may be true, but something more fundamental was at work. The ‘real’ truth of the
matter had already been settled: namely, that those seeking asylum were of a kind who were in fact liable to throw their babies overboard. In this light, whether the photographs were/were not a true record was incidental. Further, and most fundamentally, admitting that the wrong photos had been produced threw the original representation into question and was thus resisted, both emotionally and cognitively (note that if the very same photos had been produced of a British yacht, an honourable or innocent interpretation would have been assumed from the outset).

**Social inclusion and imagination’s connective powers**

To operate effectively as policy metaphor, social inclusion needs to be both commonly understood and commonly recognised as significant. Considerable differences about the actual practice of social inclusion may persist (for example, whether it should be based on workforce participation or effective human rights); but the term must evoke common understanding as a metaphor.

Writers about the imagination ally this kind of common understanding to its ‘connective powers’. Kant ([1781/1787] 1933) argues that imagination has a ‘transcendental’ power through which phenomena are commonly recognised and understood. Coleridge drew on this proposition when he talked about the ‘connecting powers’ of the imagination that, he said, were able both to ‘conjure up an image’ and to ‘make us see that image as universally significant’ (cited in Warnock 1976, p. 82). He believed that the basis of these connective powers lay in the fact that imagination worked in the service of human ends such as creativity, wonder, and joy. Sartre ([1936] 1962; [1940] 1948) expresses the same sense of imagination serving a greater purpose when he argues that imagination must embody the capacity to refuse the present and visualise what is not now the case. Hence for Sartre, imagination carries the historic mission of opening a space for choice and action not previously determined by causal laws.

In the everyday policy arena, imagination is not revolutionary on this scale. It takes smaller — but still imaginative — steps in visualising how things should be. It concerns itself with how a society or community is and ought to be, particularly as far as its ethos, codes, and practices are concerned. It is a specifically moral imagination. This moral/prescriptive character ensures that social inclusion is highly contested and differentiated when actually translated into policy. Compare, in this instance, Titmuss’s emphasis on obligations to strangers with Etzioni’s insistence on the community as the primary site of social belonging, or T. H. Marshall’s focus on social rights with the contemporary neo-liberal view that citizenship must be earned. Importantly, current accounts — or at least the more influential ones — fall near the conservative end of the continuum, and all, moreover, rest on moral/behavioural considerations rather than human rights as the basis for inclusion.
Appeals to social inclusion simultaneously include and exclude, as John Howard’s reference to the ‘values that unite us as Australians’ and his call for a ‘common overriding commitment’ to ‘respect for the rule of law, democracy and the institutions of the state’ (1999, 2001b) show. Here unity is to be built around commonly shared values and those deemed not to hold those values are to be excluded. Calls to social inclusion can also rely directly on denigration. Thus, for example, writers such as Charles Murray (1984), Lawrence Mead (1986, 1992) and Lucy Sullivan (2000) appeal to (and produce) a community of tax-paying, hard working, and wronged members through their construction of an underclass of alienated welfare dependents.

Emotion and social inclusion

Moral imaginings in the public arena have firm emotional foundations. More than the more positive sentiments of sympathy and courage are at work here. Barbalet’s (1998) groundbreaking work on emotion and social structure explores the range of negative emotions we experience in self/other relations: resentment, shame, vengefulness, and fear. Fear now plays a particularly important role in official calls to social inclusion. It is behind the neo-conservative belief that something has gone terribly wrong with the social and moral order, as well as the underclass theorists’ contention that the poor have become isolated from mainstream society, and are concentrated in pathological and dangerous communities that promote parasitism and immorality as well as dependence.

In the face of such fears, the values considered under threat — social responsibility, social unity, democracy, and so on — are mustered and affirmed. This affirmation gives expression to our wish to belong, to be connected, and for our worlds to be safe and familiar. It also appeals to a common perception of what is right, good, and valuable. This makes the affirmation hard to challenge. Further, its opposites hold no currency, either rational or emotional, for which of us would aspire to intolerance, bigotry, injustice or totalitarian rule? The emotional force of belonging becomes tied to prescribed core values. There is nothing troublesome in this per se. What is worrying is a certain ‘smuggling act’ whereby supposed threats to these values are linked to particular persons and practices, and, through them, to signifiers such as race, religion, and country of origin. And herein lies an important link between fear, identity, and social inclusion.

Charles Taylor suggests that identity provides the reference point for determining ‘what is right, good, or valuable, or what ought to be done’ (1990, p. 27). This, he says, orients us in a moral space — a space in which we decide our position on some fundamental question about ‘what is’ and ‘what should be’. Such determinations

1 For a critique of this argument, see Levitas (1998, p. 18).
almost invariably involve comparison, drawing a community together by emphasising the differences between it and those on the outside. And when a community feels under threat, comparisons may well take on a defensive, exaggerated, and disparaging tone (see also Hage 2003). Elaborating, Campbell suggests that ‘the notion of what “we” are is intrinsic to an understanding of what “we” fear … to have a threat requires enforcing a closure on the community that is threatened’ (Campbell 1998, p. 73). Identity then looks inward and backward, achieving closure around it. We call this a ‘what we are/what we are not’ rendition of identity. It can be contrasted with a more confident rendering, where identity is dynamic, and the possibility of change can be entertained. In this case, the focus comes to rest on ‘what we might be’.

In both instances, and particularly the first, identity has an intimate bearing on social inclusion as it defines the parameters of community and sets out the attributes and beliefs a person must have in order to belong. And national identity, to which we now turn, is particularly important.

Social inclusion and national identity

National identity establishes the qualities a person must have in order to be considered a ‘real’ citizen. These qualities flow down from the nation to local communities. In this sense, national identity acts as a ‘master narrative’ in the field of social inclusion. While this has always been the case — nation trumps community — official accounts of national identity have taken on a new urgency in recent years. There are two reasons for this. First, the move away from the national provisions of the old welfare state towards what Rose (1996, p. 231) calls the ‘micro-moral’ community risks leaving a vacuum at the level of national belonging. What it is to be ‘Australian’ or ‘British’ is now less securely tied to sharing a common system of wage regulation, education or, in the case of Britain, a national health system. An emphasis on national identity pitched around notions of shared responsibility and common commitments helps fill this vacuum. Second, national identity always plays a heightened role in periods of economic and political vulnerability such as the present. The current situation also has certain peculiar features, fundamentally complicating issues of national security. Australia finds itself caught between the move to dissolve economic boundaries in response to globalisation and the drive toward national closure in response to fears of terrorism. National identity proves useful in both cases and helps bridge the opposition between the mandated responses. Asserting the nature of our products and our companies identifies the nation’s stake in the competitive economic game, while calling on our values justifies socio-political closure in the name of national security.

We now outline the contours of official depictions of Australian national identity over the last century. We propose three major shifts: from the ‘character’ or ‘self’ attributed to whiteness, to lifestyle and cultural practices, and finally to certain social and moral
values said to signify ‘the Australian way’. We recognise that each and every stage is marked by contestation and that national identity is an ongoing, unfinished, and ambiguous project. We are concerned solely with its more dominant framings.

**Whiteness**

In the first part of the 20th century, the most influential representations of national identity centred on a white, racialised self based upon the British ‘national type’. The *Immigration Restriction Act* 1901 did not just exclude undesirables. It also affirmed a particular national identity, expressing in McQueen’s terms ‘a code of civic morality … a doctrine full of affirmative values, offering much more than a negative rejection of other peoples’ (1986, cited in Kane 1997, p. 118). The desired attributes of civic behaviour hinged on a moral, social, and psychological type who was to be independent, egalitarian, and confident (White 1981, p. 64). The connective element of this version of national identity centred on Australian mateship underpinned by a commitment to hard work and independence. This version set the contours of social inclusion for a long time, for, although its gendered dimensions have changed, the commitment to the ‘battler’ — as well as a tendency to cast the ‘fair go’ in terms of paid employment — endures.

The emotional foundations of this prototype were clear from the outset: vulnerability about the national vision (was it really possible to build a new, egalitarian version of Britishness in this vastly different land?) coupled with fear and distrust of the indigenous and neighbouring Asiatic populations. Prophetically, this linked national identity with the denigration of ‘what we are not’, with Alfred Deakin commenting that ‘no motive power operated more universally on this Continent … than the desire that we should be one people, and remain one people, without the admixture of other races’ (cited in Willard [1923] 1967, p. 119). The prejudicial attitudes to which this gave rise are widely known. For example, the outbreak of smallpox and leprosy in the late 19th century was widely presumed to have been introduced by Chinese arrivals (Willard [1923] 1967, p. 61) and, more generally, the Chinese were held responsible for ‘disease, defilement, depravity, misery and crime’. Worse still, they ‘cannot be trusted in a household or near any of its female members’. To the Premier of New South Wales, Henry Parkes, ‘they were a moral and social pestilence’ (all cited in Immigration Reform Group 1962, p. 11).

**Lifestyle**

Around the mid-1950s, the racialised representation of identity shifted to ‘the Australian way of life’. When high migrant intakes from continental Europe made it more difficult to sustain Britishness as the basis for national identity, dominant representations shifted from the ‘national type’ (those like us/not like us) to a particular ‘way of life’ (those who *live* like us/don’t live like us). The connective call
now centred on a common commitment to suburban patterns of production and consumption, coupled with an ordered, family-centred, lifestyle.

During this period, the emotional drivers changed from outright fear of the alien to hope for his or her assimilation, while optimism, marked by a faith in national security, prosperity, and the quarter acre block overtook some of the old insecurities. By the 1970s more expansionary notions of national identity emerged, marked, in particular, by the publication of the Australian Ethnic Affairs Council’s report, *Australia as a Multicultural Society* (1977) and the tabling in Parliament of the Galbally Report, *Review of Post Arrival Programs and Services to Migrants* (1978). Although the Galbally Report was linked to economic considerations, and although it emphasised that ethnic diversity should not be stressed at the expense of society at large, it heralded nevertheless an important shift — or, more accurately, an important potential shift — in official representations of national identity. Instead of concentrating on ‘what we are/what we are not’, the national imagination could now consider ‘what we might be’. In this way, and for a brief spell, ideas of national identity looked forward, making it possible to imagine incorporating difference and even being changed by it. As part of this, values such as tolerance and diversity were added to the lexicon of what being Australian might imply (Zubrzycki 1968).

The Australian way

The antecedents of the current rendering of national identity as ‘the Australian way’ can be traced to the opposition provoked by the more open stance of the Galbally era. Here it is important to recall our argument that the willingness to imagine ‘what we might be’ is associated with a certain confidence and security about the present, whereas anxiety and vulnerability give rise to a preoccupation with ‘what we are/what we are not’.

These latter sentiments opposed more confident feelings from the outset. Arthur Schlesinger’s (1992) fears that multiculturalism would result in the ‘disuniting of America’, and the conservatism of Le Pen in Europe (for discussion, see Henley 2002) have found strong parallels in Australia. In 1984 controversies following the publication of Blainey’s *All for Australia* (1984) gave xenophobia a good academic start and hostility to ethnic minorities was inflamed by the parliamentary maiden speech of Independent Senator Pauline Hanson twelve years later (Australia, House of Representatives 1996). Such developments lie behind current policies of asylum seeker exclusion (in particular, harsh enforcement of mandatory detention, the introduction of Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs) in 1999, and the passing of a package of restrictive laws in 2001 which, among other things, prevents people who have spent more than seven days in a ‘safe country’ ever getting more than a TPV in Australia).
But national identity cannot be constructed along negative and exclusionary lines alone. As McQueen (1986) observes it needs to affirm as well as deny. Currently, this is demonstrated by John Howard’s prescriptive call to ‘the Australian way’. This, in distinction to the earlier ‘Australian way of life’, is based not on lifestyle but on abstract universals like tolerance and a fair go. To be Australian is to share that ‘common overriding commitment’ to the ‘values that unite us as Australians — tolerance, justice and a fair go for all’ (Howard 1999, 2001b). To be ‘un-Australian’ is not to share this commitment. Ironically, the very values that had the potential to widen national identity and social inclusion in the Galbally era — tolerance, justice, and so on — are now mobilised to effect closure, with a new accent on Australian multiculturalism (Howard 1999). This emphasises cultural diversity rather than human rights, and advances diversity under the common rubric of Australian values.

Two things need to be stressed here. First, the very vagueness of ‘the Australian way’ makes it all the more adaptable. Second, despite its apparent open-endedness, this rendering of national identity is firmly based on the inward looking ‘what we are/what we are not’ tradition. It embodies a fortress mentality in which identity is contingent on the ‘constitution of difference’ (Connolly 1991, p. 9) and where ‘the “we-ness” of friends owes its materiality to the “they-ness” of the enemies’ (Bauman 1992, p. 678). Consider Howard’s reflections on the possibility that asylum seekers had thrown their children overboard:

the behaviour of a number of these people, particularly those involving throwing their children overboard … I can’t imagine how a genuine refugee would ever do that. A refugee flees persecution or flees a country more than anything else in the name of the future of his or her children and anybody who would endanger the lives of their children in that kind of way, I find it hard to accept. I certainly don’t want people of that type in Australia (2001a, emphasis added).

On this account, there is an ‘ideal’ refugee, one who doesn’t harm themselves or their children, jump queues, arrive illegally, or bring disease and these refugees would stand a better chance at inclusion. But there is another kind — ‘people of that type’ — who are threatening because, by their actions, they most obviously do not share a commitment to our Australian values, will not adopt an Australian way of life, and can never assume an Australian identity.

In summary, present renderings of national identity are open-ended, provisional, and watchful. Identity is more open-ended than under the White Australia policy, and three decades of equal opportunity policy have ensured that people cannot be
officially barred from participation in national activities on the basis of race, gender, and so on — except in so far as a particularly restrictive reading of the UN Convention on Refugees still manages to achieve this effect. Anyone, it seems, can potentially belong. But belonging is conditional on adherence to ‘the Australian way’, a standard that cannot be met through passing a dictation test — or even by adopting a prescribed lifestyle, although that comes closer. Consequently, national identity remains provisional — adherence to core values can be called to account at any given time. An attendant watchfulness arises from the propensity to see outsiders and dissidents as imminent threats, and can be compared with the assimilationist faith of the Galbally era. Watchfulness is evident in monitoring the commitments of the unemployed, ascertaining the progress of communities and welfare organisations through quality assurance, and checking out dissidents.

At this point it might be objected that as far as the kind of people who experience inclusion and exclusion are concerned, matters have changed barely a jot over the last century. A few ethnic and racial shifts, maybe, and rather more gender change, but those inside and outside remain basically the same. We argue that this demonstrates the power of the elite moral imagination to achieve continuities of privilege and exclusion in vastly different social and economic circumstances.

**National identity, social inclusion, and the moral imagination revisited**

We have concentrated on how notions of social inclusion and national identity get fired up by the moral imagination and, more broadly, by the intuitive/emotional space within which the moral imagination shelters. Ours, though, is not a case against the moral imagination *per se* — a world without it would be literally unthinkable. The task is to figure out, and where necessary challenge, its workings and effects. We conclude by reflecting on the associations between national identity, social inclusion, and the moral imagination.

We have argued that national identity has ‘master status’ in defining the evolving meaning of social inclusion in Australia. We have argued further that national identity currently takes on an abstract and ambiguous form centred on ‘the Australian way’. This means that imagination is able to do double work because one mental representation — ‘national identity’ — is simply defined in terms of another — ‘Australian values’. This widens the scope for imaginative dealings, and while giving the appearance of openness, allows for distinct patterns of closure, to be adapted as the need arises. In its turn, the connective energy of the moral imagination is played out in the call to democracy, participation, tolerance, and the fair go at both national and local community levels. Here the appeal to the collective consciousness — the ‘connecting call of the imagination’ — is not so much to ‘all the people’, but a call to get all people to think and behave in a certain way.
The breadth of this appeal to Australian values means that the same prescriptive claims about inclusion and exclusion pertain at both national and local sites. Mutual obligation, for instance, reaches down to local communities with its claim that the fair go and social responsibility are the defining features of social inclusion. And relying on the ‘simple proposition’ that ‘unemployed job seekers, supported financially by the community, should … give something to the community that supports them’ (Kemp 1998, p. 1), mutual obligation questions the citizenship of those not passing this test. Exactly the same kind of dynamic is at work when the exclusion of asylum seekers is justified through appealing to the unfairness of queue jumping or arriving illegally.

Official representations of social inclusion and national identity emphasise moral and behavioural issues at the expense of human and citizenship rights as the basis of belonging. This promotes a subjective link between social inclusion and personal identity, particularly among those at risk of exclusion. In this vein, the unemployed are induced to consider themselves as obliged to give something back to the community, while refugee policy requires those in flight to imagine themselves as responsibly waiting for their turn.

We have drawn attention to the part played by fear in current constructions of social inclusion and national identity. In the case of welfare reform, the agenda is driven by apprehensions about rising costs, dependency, and international competitiveness, while migration and refugee programs reflect fears about the security of the state and the safety and wellbeing of the Australian people. Such concerns are seen to justify, even require, the exclusion of those outside the nation who might defy the Australian way and the re-education of those inside who display such propensities. Further, in response to its perceptions of terrorism the government has established a threat, omnipresent and unpredictable, which, by its nature, cannot be fully guarded against. William Connolly suggests that when governments can no longer act as the ‘agent of efficacy’, they attempt to hide their powerlessness through re-locating the danger within subordinated and unpopular groups. In an observation that graphically illustrates the situation of asylum seekers in Australia, Connolly notes that such targets are more useful if:

(a) they can be constituted as evils responsible for threats to the common identity, (b) their visibility might otherwise signify defects or failings in the established identity, (c) they are strategically weak enough to be subjected to punitive measures, and (d) they are resilient enough to renew their status as sources of evil in the face of such measures (1991, p. 207).

The problem with such configurations is not their imaginary nature. Rather, it is that their imaginings are inadequate and misplaced. Their musings turn inward not outward,
attack the wrong targets, and fail to acknowledge the global forces contributing to inequality and economic instability. They grasp old, punitive solutions in a world crying out for new, creative ones. And in their wake, those so-called Australian values — democracy, tolerance, the fair go, and respect for the law — all seriously important, get attached to particular people and practices and divorced from the political, social, and economic structures that nurture them. The big task for the moral imagination in public life is to re-imagine the role of these values and their supportive structures while setting social inclusion firmly within the frame of human rights.

REFERENCES


